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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This case requires us to determine whether a 
misdemeanor can be an "aggravated felony" under a 
provision of federal law even if it is not, technically 
speaking, a felony at all. The particular question before us 
is whether petit larceny, a class A misdemeanor under New 
York law that carries a maximum sentence of one year, can 
subject a federal defendant to the extreme sanctions 
imposed by the "aggravated felon" classification. Despite 
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our misgivings that, in pursuit of a clearly defined 
legislative goal (to severely punish unlawful reentry into 
this country), a carelessly drafted piece of legislation has 
improvidently, if not inadvertently, broken the historic line 
of division between felonies and misdemeanors, we 
conclude that Congress was sufficiently clear in its intent to 
include certain crimes with one-year sentences in the 
definition of "aggravated felony." Congress has the power to 
determine penalties for unlawful reentry into this country 
and to define the classes of persons subject to those 
penalties. We think that in this case Congress's definition 
requires a finding that this defendant was an aggravated 
felon, though not a felon in the conventional sense, and 
therefore we will affirm the judgment of the District Court, 
which sentenced Winston Graham in accordance with that 
approach. 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
Graham was deported in 1996 after serving a previous 
sentence for reentering the country after his deportation in 
1990. He returned to the United States without permission 
from the Attorney General and was arrested by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1997. He again 
pled guilty to reentry into the US following deportation, a 
violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326, and was sentenced to 72 
months in prison. The appeal is from that judgment, and 
raises only sentencing issues. 
 
Graham has three state convictions: In February 1986, 
he was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana, a 
violation with a maximum fine of $100, stemming from a 
November 1985 arrest. In May 1986, he was convicted of 
attempted possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor 
with a maximum of three months' imprisonment, stemming 
from a November 1984 arrest. Finally, in May 1990, he was 
convicted of petit larceny, a Class A misdemeanor with a 
maximum of a year's imprisonment under New York law. 
See N.Y. Penal Law S 155.25 (McKinney 1997). He received 
a sentence of one year. 
 
Congress has classified certain crimes as "aggravated 
felonies" for purposes of immigration and deportation. See 
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8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43). In this case, the aggravated felony 
classification increases the penalty for the crime of 
reentering the country after deportation. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) (incorporating the aggravated felony 
definitions of 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)). The District Court 
found that Graham's second drug conviction and his petit 
larceny conviction should be classified as aggravated 
felonies, which triggered a sixteen-level increase in the base 
offense level. The aggravated felony classification changed 
Graham's guideline sentence range from 21-27 months to 
70-87 months. 
 
The District Court reasoned that, because Graham had a 
prior drug possession conviction, his second conviction 
would have been a federal felony. However, because the 
conduct underlying Graham's second possession conviction 
did not occur after his first possession conviction had 
become final, as the applicable statute requires in order to 
convert a second possession offense into a felony, see 21 
U.S.C. S 844(a), Graham would not have been subject to 
felony punishment even had he been convicted under 
federal law. The government concedes the error on appeal, 
and therefore we need not resolve the question of whether 
this "hypothetical federal felony" treatment is appropriate. 
 
We may still uphold Graham's sentence in its entirety, 
however, because if even one of Graham's prior convictions 
qualifies as an aggravated felony, the full sixteen-level 
increase applies. The District Court reasoned that the petit 
larceny offense was also an aggravated theft felony because 
it carried a maximum sentence of at least one year. 
Graham argues that section 1101(a)(43)(G), which defines a 
theft crime that qualifies as an aggravated felony, is 
patently ambiguous because it is missing a critical verb 
and can be interpreted two ways, one of which supports 
Graham's claim. Therefore, he argues that due process 
concerns and the rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous 
statutes to be construed in favor of defendants, support his 
claim.1 Graham also contends that the uses of "aggravated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Graham also argues that collateral estoppel applies. We reject this 
contention. In his prior unlawful reentry prosecution, the District Court 
added four points to his criminal history instead of sixteen, based on the 
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felony" elsewhere in Title 8 make clear that an "aggravated 
felony" must first be a felony. While we reject both of these 
claims, the latter in particular deserves serious 
consideration. 
 
II. Minimum Sentence Versus Sentence Imposed 
 
Section 1101(a)(43)(G) defines as an aggravated felony "a 
theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment at 
least one year." The sentence is obviously missing a crucial 
verb. Graham argues that there are two options: The 
statute could apply to theft offenses "for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year" or to theft offenses "for 
which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one 
year." He then argues that, because we should interpret 
ambiguous statutes to favor defendants, we should 
interpret the statute to mean "is," not "imposed," so that 
the minimum term for the theft offense has to be at least 
one year. Since petit larceny carries no minimum term, he 
contends, it is not an aggravated felony under his 
interpretation. 
 
Graham claims that the rule of lenity mandates his 
interpretation--courts should not interpret a statute to 
increase a penalty when the interpretation can be based on 
"no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." 
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
very same information. However, the change in the law governing the 
definition of aggravated felonies means that the issues are no longer the 
same, and therefore collateral estoppel cannot apply. Under the law as 
it existed at the time of Graham's previous reentry prosecution, theft 
convictions had to carry sentences of at least five years to qualify as 
aggravated felonies, but Congress amended the law to change "five" to 
"one." Furthermore, the government did not object to the presentence 
report in the previous sentencing proceeding and the district judge 
adopted the report and its findings in its entirety. The matter was thus 
not actually litigated in the previous sentencing proceeding. See Haring 
v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983); In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1203 
(5th Cir. 1996) (issue is not actually litigated if it is not denied by 
the 
other party); In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1992) (issues critical 
to judgment are nonetheless not "actually litigated" if the parties 
stipulate to them). 
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However, the rule of lenity does not apply simply because 
a statute requires interpretation. See Caron v. United 
States, 118 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (1998) (the rule is "not 
invoked by a grammatical possibility"); Muscarello v. United 
States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) (the rule only applies 
if "after seizing everything from which aid can be derived 
. . . we can make no more than a guess as to what 
Congress intended" (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Courts will also consider other clear provisions of 
a law in order to interpret an ambiguous portion of the 
statute. See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Graham's statutory construction is flawed. Before its 
amendment in 1996, section 1101(43)(G) defined 
"aggravated felony" in relevant part as "a theft offense . . . 
for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of 
any suspension of such imprisonment) is at leastfive 
years." The reference was clearly to the term imposed and 
not to the statutory minimum. Although the 1996 
amendments created a typographical error by inadvertently 
removing the verb, there is no evidence that Congress 
intended to begin relying on the statutory minimum rather 
than the sentence actually imposed for a conviction. As we 
read the statute as a whole, even if "is" were the missing 
verb, the reference to "term of imprisonment" would still be 
to the term actually imposed, whatever the potential 
maximum might have been. What Graham really wants us 
to do is to imply the word "minimum" into the statute, so 
that the minimum term provided for by law would have to 
be at least one year to constitute an aggravated felony. 
 
The statute, however, never suggests that the proper 
referent is a crime's statutory minimum. As part of the 
1996 amendments, Congress added a definitional provision 
at section 1101(a)(48)(B), providing that "[a]ny reference [in 
S 1101(a)] to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with 
respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of 
incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law 
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution 
of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part."2 This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A further conforming amendment deleted the phrase "imposed 
(regardless of any suspension of imprisonment)" each place it appeared 
in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (N), and (P). 
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suggests that the actual term imposed is ordinarily the 
definitional touchstone. 
 
It is true, as Graham contends, that other language in 
section 1101(a)(43) refers to a term that may be imposed as 
opposed to one that is imposed. See S 1101(a)(43)(J) 
(covering racketeering and gambling crimes "for which a 
sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be 
imposed"); S 1101(a)(43)(T) ("an offense relating to a failure 
to appear before a court . . . for which a sentence of 2 
years' imprisonment or more may be imposed"). Graham is 
correct that the "may be imposed" language of these 
provisions is inconsistent with a reading of section 
1101(a)(48)(B) that would insist that every reference to a 
"term of imprisonment" refers to the term actually imposed. 
It is reasonable to read section 1101(a)(48)(B) instead as an 
instruction about how to treat suspended sentences. 
 
However, there is still no indication that Congress wished 
to make the statutory minimum for a crime relevant to the 
definition of "aggravated felony." The fact that some 
provisions of section 1101(a)(43) refer to a term that "may 
be imposed" while others refer to crimes "for which the term 
of imprisonment is at least 12 months," S 1101(a)(43)(P), 
demonstrate that Congress knows how to distinguish 
between the penalty authorized for a crime and the penalty 
actually imposed in a particular case. See also 
S 1101(a)(43)(R) (covering commercial bribery, 
counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles with altered 
vehicle identification numbers "for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year"); S 1101(a)(43)(S) 
(covering obstruction of justice, perjury, subornation of 
perjury, and witness bribery "for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year"). The maximum possible 
penalty and the penalty actually imposed, then, may be 
relevant, but there is simply no evidence that the minimum 
penalty ever matters in determining whether a crime is an 
"aggravated felony." 
 
We conclude that when Congress amended the law it did 
not intend to establish a minimum penalty threshold. 
Instead, it lowered the maximum penalty required to make 
a theft violation an aggravated felony. Cf. United States v. 
Cordova-Beraud, 90 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 1996) ("imposed" 
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refers to the particular defendant's actual record sentence, 
or, if the sentence is indeterminate, its upper bound). Even 
construing the statute favorably towards Graham, there is 
no indication that we should consider the minimum 
possible penalty as opposed to the penalty actually ordered 
by the sentencing court. We therefore reject Graham's 
argument that a one-year sentence for a crime with no 
statutory minimum falls outside section 1101(a)(43)(G). 
 
III. Can Misdemeanors Be Felonies? 
 
Graham's best argument for lenity is as follows: 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(G) defines an aggravated felony as a theft 
offense with a sentence of at least one year. However, the 
statute defining the underlying offense of reentry after 
deportation, 8 U.S.C. S 1326(b), provides separately for 
penalties for aliens who have committed "three or more 
misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, 
or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony)." 8 
U.S.C. S 1326(b)(1). By contrast, section 1326(b)(2), the 
provision involved here, provides that an alien removed 
"subsequent to a conviction for commission of an 
aggravated felony" shall be fined or imprisoned for not more 
than 20 years. Because section 1326(b)(1) refers to certain 
specific misdemeanors that Congress has singled out for 
felony treatment and also implies that aggravated felonies 
are a subset of felonies, it seems odd to hold that a 
misdemeanor that does not fall under section 1326(b)(1) 
can be an aggravated felony, as it is not a felony. Graham 
argues that we should assume that Congress did not intend 
to change the historic line between felonies and 
misdemeanors when it made its rather clumsy amendment 
decreasing the threshold for aggravated felonies from five 
years to one year. 
 
This is an issue of first impression in the federal courts. 
In the cases cited by the government, courts interpolated 
"is" or "was" as the verb in the aggravated felony statute, so 
that it applies to crimes "for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year."3 But that does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See United States v. Mendoza-Corrales, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 911696, 
at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 31, 1998) (using "for which the term of 
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answer the question whether section 1326(b) can apply to 
misdemeanors.  
 
The line between felonies and misdemeanors is an 
ancient one. The line has not always been drawn between 
one year and one year and a day, since it used to be that 
felonies were all punishable by death. With the rise of the 
penitentiary and the disappearance of the death penalty for 
most felonies, however, the felony-misdemeanor distinction 
solidified at the one-year line. The distinction was 
intertwined with the definition of "infamous crimes," which 
came to be defined as crimes punishable by more than one 
year of confinement. The one-year mark was used by 
Congress as early as 1865. See United States v. Ramirez, 
556 F.2d 909, 913-21 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing, in 
extensive detail, the evolution of "infamous crimes" to mean 
crimes punishable by more than a year's confinement); see 
also Thorm v. United States, 59 F.2d 419, 419 (3d Cir. 
1932) (linking "infamous crimes" with felonies and noting 
the consistent more-than-one-year line in federal law); cf. In 
re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890) (using the more-than-one year 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
imprisonment [was] at least one year" when the defendant received a 
two-year sentence); United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 
WL 874860, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1998) (using"for which the term 
of imprisonment [is] at least one year" when the defendant had a two- 
year sentence); United States v. Pantin, 155 F.3d 91, 92 n.2 (2d Cir. 
1998) (using "for which the term of imprisonment[is] at least one year" 
when the defendant had a four-year sentence and the defendant did not 
dispute the aggravated felony classification), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 
3436 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999); Valderrama-Fonseca v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 116 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1997) ("any burglary 
offense for which the sentence of imprisonment is at least one year" is 
an aggravated felony; defendant had a two-year sentence). Interestingly, 
Choeum v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 129 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 
1997), slipped back into the traditional felony/misdemeanor line when 
discussing the aggravated felony statute, though in that case it was clear 
that the immigrant's crime was a felony, as she had a three to nine year 
sentence. The court quoted 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(F), without attempting 
to fix its grammatical error (the same error as found in S 
1101(a)(43)(G)). 
Then, the court wrote that, because Choeum's crime satisfied the 
definition of a crime of violence and "Choeum's term of imprisonment 
exceeded one year," she was guilty of an aggravated felony. Id. at 35 n.4 
(emphasis added). 
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rule to determine whether a sentence allowed imprisonment 
in a penitentiary). 
 
Furthermore, under federal law, a felony is defined as a 
crime that has a maximum term of more than one year. See 
18 U.S.C. S 3559(a); U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2 comment 1. Graham 
contends that felony status is an absolute requirement for 
an "aggravated felony." He also submits that Congress did 
not make clear its intent to change the long-established 
rule that only crimes with penalties over one year are 
felonies when it amended section 1101(a)(43), and so we 
should assume that it did not intend to change that rule. 
See Kalinowski, 146 F.3d at 199-200. 
 
The government responds that Congress made its intent 
crystal clear by amending (G) to include crimes with a 
maximum one-year penalty. Yet Congress was, obviously, 
less than painstaking in amendment, and the amendment 
was designed to decrease the range from five years (fairly 
arbitrary) to one (a term with an historic meaning, as it has 
been used to distinguish misdemeanors from felonies for a 
very long time). The legislative history is not particularly 
helpful. The Senate Report on the amendment stated in 
relevant part that it "[l]owers fine and imprisonment 
thresholds in the definition (from 5 years to 1 year . . .), 
thereby broadening the coverage of . . . theft . . .." S. Rep. 
No. 249, 104th Cong., 1996 WL 180026. An intent to 
broaden the coverage of the aggravated felony classification, 
however, is not necessarily an intent to include 
misdemeanors in that category. There is no evidence that 
Congress noticed that it was breaking the time-honored line 
between felonies and misdemeanors. 
 
Because, as the government contends, the amended 
statute's definition of an aggravated theft felony refers to 
sentences actually imposed and not to potential sentences, 
it is still possible for a felon to avoid being an aggravated 
felon if he or she receives a six-month sentence for a theft 
crime with a maximum possible sentence over one year. 
Therefore, though Congress evidenced an intent to increase 
the scope of the statute, it did put some limit on the 
punitiveness of the change. Moreover, Graham's 
interpretation would not render the literal wording of the 
statute meaningless. Some one-year sentences would still 
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be aggravated felonies--those imposed for felonies, that is, 
for crimes with maximum terms of more than one year. 
 
If we accepted Graham's argument, the affected set of 
defendants would be those sentenced to a full year for a 
misdemeanor covered by section 1101(a)(43). These are 
obviously the most serious misdemeanants, and we can see 
a rational reason that Congress might include them in the 
class of defendants worthy of extra punishment. Despite 
the force of Graham's argument, we are ultimately 
unwilling to cabin the clear import of the law to exclude 
from its ambit misdemeanors for which the maximum one- 
year sentence was imposed. 
 
Congress has the power to define the punishment for the 
crime of reentering the country after deportation, and we 
conclude that Congress was defining a term of art, 
"aggravated felony," which in this case includes certain 
misdemeanants who receive a sentence of one year. Our 
decision would be much simpler if Congress had used the 
term "aggravated offense." However, rather than making the 
underlying offense conform to the label Congress 
erroneously used to describe section 1101(a)(43) as 
amended, we give effect to the definition of the underlying 
offense and ignore the label. This was the practice of the 
federal courts for many years under previous incarnations 
of federal law, as we demonstrate in the margin. 4 Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 18 U.S.C. S 1, now repealed, stated: "Notwithstanding any Act of 
Congress to the contrary: (1) Any offense punishable by death or 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is a felony. (2) Any other 
offense is a misdemeanor." The problem that spurred its enactment was 
that Congress was occasionally less than exacting in its definition of 
federal crimes. Congress would pass a substantive criminal law, labelling 
it a "misdemeanor" but providing for five years' imprisonment. The 
Revisor's Note of 1948 noted that, at the time S 1 replaced its 
predecessor, there were at least thirty occurrences of such penalties 
whose labels were inconsistent with the punishments actually 
authorized. See 8 U.S.C.A. S 1 Revisor's Note, at 50 (1969). 
 
When those inconsistencies were argued in federal court, courts 
generally held that the overarching felony/misdemeanor definition 
controlled, so that a particular statute's label would be overridden if it 
was inconsistent with the "real" definition of a felony or misdemeanor. 
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could avoid this confusion by reenacting the relevant 
portion of 18 U.S.C. S 1, which would make clear that the 
felony/misdemeanor labels in a particular criminal law are 
less important than the imprisonment actually authorized 
by that law.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See Loos v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1955) (treating a crime as 
a felony despite statutory "misdemeanor" language because the term was 
more than a year); Sheridan v. United States, 236 F. 305 (9th Cir. 1916) 
(same); Hoss v. United States, 232 F. 328 (8th Cir. 1916) (same); United 
States v. York, 131 F. 323 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (treating a crime as a 
misdemeanor despite statutory "felony" language because the crime had 
not actually been made a felony); United States v. Green, 140 F. Supp. 
117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("[S 1] provides. . . that if the allowable 
punishment is one year or less, the crime is a misdemeanor. Thus, it is 
the penalty which governs the classification and not any characterization 
or classification given by the Common Law or by a statute which governs 
the penalty."), aff 'd, 241 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1957), aff 'd, 356 U.S. 165 
(1958). But see United States v. Chapman, 3 F. Supp. 900, 901 (S.D. Ala. 
1931) (treating a crime labelled a "misdemeanor" in the substantive law 
as a misdemeanor despite the fact that the maximum penalty was more 
than a year, reasoning that the general rule only applied where the 
specific statute at issue failed to label an offense). The 
"notwithstanding 
any Act of Congress to the contrary" language, added in 1948 to the 
1909 definition that was otherwise left untouched, affirmed the majority 
view of the courts. 
 
5. 18 U.S.C. S 1, which used to define felonies and misdemeanors, was 
repealed in 1984 when 18 U.S.C. S 3559 replaced it. The legislative 
history suggests that S 3559 was enacted to put the definitions of felony 
and misdemeanor within the sentencing part of the statute and to create 
subdivisions within the felony and misdemeanor categories, consistent 
with the reformers' desire to create clear sentencing categories. Thus, 
the 
repeal seems to have been mostly a matter of housekeeping. See S. Rep. 
No. 225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 1983 WL 25404 
(Leg. Hist.) ("Section 3559 specifies how the classification system 
created 
in Section 3581(b) applies to offenses that are not specifically graded by 
letter grade."). This interpretation is supported by the fact that S 1 was 
repealed as unnecessary while the Senate Report went on to say that 
proposed S 3559 had no counterpart in current federal law, because 
federal law did not at the time classify within the felony and 
misdemeanor categories. See id. That statement would only make sense 
if the sole aim of the the switch from S 1 toS 3559 was the addition of 
classes of felonies and misdemeanors to federal law. 
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The aggravated felon classification has serious 
consequences for those subject to it, as this case 
demonstrates. Many members of Congress have been 
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers, with a likely 
respect for the venerable divide between felonies and 
misdemeanors. They might wish to revisit the issue or at 
least obviate the difficult question posed by this case with 
more careful drafting.6 However, because Graham's petit 
larceny sentence qualified him as an "aggravated felon," we 
will affirm the judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion to 
the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, the 
Ranking Members and the Majority and Minority Counsel of the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees. 
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